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Citizens’ Blame of Politicians for Public Service Failure: Experimental 
Evidence about Blame Reduction through Delegation and Contracting 
  
Abstract 
Theories of blame suggest that contracting out public service delivery reduces citizens’ blame 
of politicians for service failure. We use an online experiment with 1,000 citizen participants 
to estimate the effects of information cues summarizing service delivery arrangements on 
citizens’ blame of English local government politicians for poor street maintenance. 
Participants were randomized to one of four cues: no information about service delivery 
arrangements, politicians’ involvement in managing delivery, delegation to a unit inside 
government managing delivery, and delegation through a contract with a private firm 
managing delivery.  The politicians’ managing delivery cue raises blame compared to 
citizens having no information. However, the contract with a private firm cue doesn’t reduce 
blame compared to either no information or the politicians’ managing delivery cue. Instead, 
the delegation to a unit inside government cue reduces blame compared to politicians 
managing delivery, suggesting delegation to public managers not contracting reduces blame 
in this context. 
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Introduction 
 
Blame, defined as the act of attributing a ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’ outcome or action to a particular 
person, group or organizational entity by an audience, is a central part of citizens’ interaction 
with politicians and public managers (Weaver 1986; McGraw 1990; 2001; Hood 2003; 
2011). Blame spurs citizens and users to complain and to vote against incumbent politicians 
and, because of negativity bias entailing greater magnitude of response to failure than 
success, is generally seen as more powerful than credit (Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog 1992; 
Boyne et al. 2009; Dowding and John 2012). Christopher Hood (2003; 2011, 67–89) has 
suggested contracting of public service delivery by governments as an ‘agency strategy’ for 
politicians to use delegation of managing delivery of the service to the contractor to avoid 
blame for potential service failures. This expectation is reasonable because institutional 
structures have sheltered politicians from blame in several other contexts. Blame for natural 
disasters and for funding cuts to services has been found to be spread across levels and 
branches of government and is influenced by descriptions of office-holders’ involvement 
(Weaver 1987; Arnold 1990; Malhotra and Kuo 2008; Mortensen 2012).  
 
Whether contracting service delivery actually reduces citizens’ blame of politicians 
when public services fail has not previously been subjected to systematic empirical 
investigation. It is an important question because contracting to deliver services 
commissioned by governments and paid for by taxation is common across many types of 
public services and jurisdictions (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2006; Greve 2008). The 
blame theory perspective on contracting is a valuable alternative to the economic efficiency 
and legal responsibility perspectives that predominate in the current literature on contracting 
(Savas 1987; Hodge 2000; for a review see Bel and Fageda 2009). The attribution of blame 
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for service failure is an integral part of systems of public services because of the democratic 
control relationship between citizens and politicians for those services and deserves specific 
empirical evaluation. If contracting out reduces blame then such structures could potentially 
even be used by politicians to insulate themselves from citizens’ criticism of service failures, 
which might weaken democratic control over these services.  
 
The first section of this article sets out a theory of citizens’ blame of politicians for 
service failure, which suggests that use of contracting out services as a structure for 
delivering public services is a form of information cue for citizens. Information cues are 
‘shortcut’ labels and summaries that provide information that allows citizens to economize on 
the mass of possible information available about political issues. Cues have been found to be 
influential on citizens’ perceptions, attitudes and behaviors in related contexts (Downs 1957; 
Lupia and McCubbins 1998; James 2011a). The second section sets out an experiment to 
evaluate hypothesized reductions in citizens’ blame of politicians from a cue about contracted 
service delivery managed by a private firm in contrast to cues about alternative ways of 
managing service delivery. We focus on a core local public service, street maintenance in 
English local government under the supervision of elected politicians. The experiment used 
an online panel of 1,000 citizens and presented them with a photographic representation to 
show a poor service, drawing on previously used visual methods to present service outcomes 
to citizens (Van Ryzin, Immerwahr and Altman 2008; Van Ryzin 2013). This scenario was 
followed by random allocation of four different information cues about the form of service 
delivery: 1) management of service delivery contracted to a private firm, 2) no information 
about managing service delivery, 3) delivery within the local government with management 
by a delegated unit, and 4) politicians directly involved in managing service delivery. 
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Following receipt of one of these cues, citizens were asked about their blame of politicians 
enabling us to compare blame between groups receiving the different cues.  
 
The third section sets out the findings that lead us to question the theoretical 
expectation of contracting reducing citizens’ blame of politicians for failure. The information 
cue about managing using delegation through contracting to a private firm does not reduce 
blame compared both to having no information about service delivery and to a cue about 
politicians managing delivery. However, contracting entails both delegation and the use of a 
particular form of contractor and we find that delegation of delivery to a unit within the local 
government does reduce blame. The fourth section develops the implication of this finding 
that the choice of type of delivery organization matters for blame. Whilst politicians cannot 
use contracting to a private firm as a blame avoidance strategy they can use delegation to a 
unit within local government. In addition, if politicians explicitly highlight their own 
association with the management of public service delivery, for example to garner approval 
from citizens by taking a hands-on role in managing services, they risk higher blame 
compared to when citizens are unaware of service delivery arrangements. Politicians need to 
be very careful to ensure that those services they are associated with managing are not 
perceived of as failing to avoid heightened blame.  
 
Blame for service failure and contracting 
 
Avoiding blame is typically more important to politicians and public managers than claiming 
credit because of negativity bias. Failures tend to be remembered more than successes and 
politicians often get less credit for their successes than blame for their failures (Lau 1982; 
1985; Weaver 1987). The asymmetry occurs in citizens’ responses to economic outcomes 
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(Soroka 2006) and comparisons of wealth between countries (Hansen, Olsen and Bech 2014). 
In the context of public services, citizens’ expectations about service quality respond more to 
information about previous low performance than information about previous high 
performance (James 2011b). Negative framing of the same public service performance 
information has been found more influential than positive framing (Olsen 2015), and 
transparency initiatives sometimes entail negative aspects of performance being given 
particular prominence (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer 2014). Information about good 
performance produced by government agencies is less credible to citizens than the same 
information coming from more independent sources. This lack of credibility is not apparent 
when reporting bad performance, suggesting that people are more believing of bad news 
about performance than good news (James and Van Ryzin 2015). Politicians are anxious to 
avoid blame for bad performance because voters punish local incumbent politicians more for 
relatively low performance than they reward them for relatively high performance (Boyne et 
al. 2009). 
  
 Public services typically involve politicians acting within a democratic framework 
using public authority to obtain resources for service provision, often through taxes, and then 
arranging for the services to be delivered. This situation is typical of local representative 
governments providing public services in many jurisdictions, including our empirical context 
of English local government. Contracts are one form of implementation structure that 
politicians have available for the delivery of public services, involving an agreement between 
the public authority and another organization managing delivery. There are many different 
types of not-for-profit or for-profit organization used as contractors; we focus on the use of 
private firms as contractors, which is common practice in many jurisdictions (Brown, Potoski 
and Van Slyke 2006; Greve 2008). This kind of contract is written and enforceable by law 
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with the contract typically specifying a price, a schedule for delivery, the service being 
delivered and quality standards (Cohen and Eimicke 2008, 4). In this sense, contracting is a 
special form of delegation, which is defined more generally as the handing over of 
responsibility for something—for example a set of tasks, a decision, or implementation of a 
service.  
 
Contracting out of public service delivery could affect the allocation of blame to local 
politicians by citizens if the service fails, in the sense of not meeting a normative expectation 
of acceptable performance, because the contractor manages the delivery of the service. 
Psychological research has found that individuals attribute outcomes to individuals and 
organizations and this affects their allocation of blame (Schlenker et al. 1994; Alicke 2000; 
Rudolph 2006). Similarly, studies of blame in political institutions share a focus on audience 
reaction to perceived failures (for overviews see Weaver 1986; Hood 2011). Citizens view 
politicians’ involvement in failure in terms of causality (the extent to which they caused, 
through their action or inaction, the failure) and the severity of outcomes (which also affects 
blame). Citizens’ judgements are informed by their view of politicians’ capacities for 
foreseeing and/or intending the consequence of failure, taking into account relevant factors 
including other actors and organizations. When citizens see the performance outcomes of a 
service as much lower than in comparable jurisdictions delivering the same service they are 
more likely to see the local politicians as being, at least in part, responsible for the poor 
performance (James and Moseley 2014). The extent of politicians’ obligation or duty to 
prevent failure, for example by moral or legal codes or social norms, further sets the context 
for blame. Complex and conflicting values and obligations may also affect citizens’ 
perceptions of blame of politicians, and could potentially represent grounds for political 
forgiveness (see Nieuwenburg 2015) which would reduce blame. 
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Within the theoretical framework on blame presented in this article, a contract for 
service delivery is an information cue for citizens showing that someone other than 
politicians is involved in the service delivery, potentially reducing blame if the service fails. 
Information cues are summary statements that reveal key information and avoid the overly 
demanding requirement, in terms of time, cognitive and other resources, of citizens having 
full information about political life. Cues have been found to influence attitudes across a 
range of contexts in politics (Downs 1957; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Hobolt, Tilley and 
Wittrock 2013), including citizens’ perceptions of the performance of public services (James 
2011a). Sometimes a cue is just a label, for example a label about the political party in 
control of an administration, but they can be any summary characterization of a broader or 
more complex situation using a much shortened form. We theorize that the cues about 
contracting influence citizens’ blame allocation to the local politicians, helping them relate 
the failure event to these actors (Alicke 2000; Schlenker et al. 1994).  
 
Findings from executive politics suggest this expectation about the contracting cue is 
reasonable. Jurisdictional responsibility, especially across multiple levels of government, has 
consequences for citizens’ blame of politicians (Arceneaux and Stein 2006; Schneider 2008; 
Hobolt, Tilley and Wittrock 2013; Healy and Malhotra 2010). Blurred lines of accountability 
tend to weaken blame; voters are less likely to punish governments for poor economic 
performance in systems where executive power is dispersed (see Powell and Whitten 1993; 
Anderson 2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Wittrock 2013). Local government units try to blame 
central government to avoid local criticism for unpopular outcomes (Mortensen 2012). 
Nielsen and Baekgaard (2015) found that concerns about blame influence local politicians’ 
reception of performance information and their attitudes to spending on public services. 
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Public inquiries by ministers in central government, under some circumstances, have shifted 
blame to agencies and away from ministers (Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010). In understanding blame 
for rare and extreme events, Malhotra and Kuo (2008) found that party cues and job titles 
cause individuals to blame officials of the opposite party for failings that stemmed from 
Hurricane Katrina’s extensive damage to New Orleans in 2005. Similarly, Marvel (2014) 
found partisan influences, with public administrators’ analysis of the 2013 Boston Marathon 
attack being viewed as more credible by Democrat than Republican party supporters.  
 
Similar support for contracting reducing blame comes from experience in legislative 
politics. Legislative politicians manipulate chains of traceability during the legislative process 
(Arnold 1990) and keep delegation to regulatory agencies broad rather than specific in part to 
avoid blame for unpopular policy outcomes (Fiorina 1982). Weimer (2006) found regulators 
delegating rulemaking to stakeholders affected by the rule to avoid blame for these decisions. 
Legislators use strategies to manipulate citizens’ judgments about who was responsible to 
manage blame when they vote for unpopular legislation (McGraw 1990; 1991; 2001). In 
these terms, the information cue about delegation of service delivery to a private contractor 
can be seen as a form of mitigation that potentially reduces citizens’ blame of politicians. 
Further support for this expectation comes from evidence about the delegation of decisions. 
Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) found that blame of a ‘principal’ who made decisions 
affecting a recipient was reduced by delegating unpopular (for the recipient) decisions to 
others. 
 
Scholars have conducted very little empirical research on contracting and blame in 
public services. However, Hood’s (2011, 67–89) work on ‘agency strategies’ for avoiding 
blame suggests that, in theory, contracting service delivery passes on at least part of the 
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responsibility from politicians to contractors, shifting blame for failure away from politicians. 
Having multiple organizations involved in services tends to reduce the blame for any 
particular organization (Hood 2011, 123). The blame theory perspective on contracting is a 
valuable alternative to economic and legal theories that predominate in the current literature 
on contracting. In this article we do not seek to mount a tournament between the competing 
theories but instead to set out the blame theory, how it differs from the better known 
alternatives, and to evaluate its empirical implications. The economic theory of contracting 
analyses contracting primarily in terms of effects on economy, effectiveness and efficiency of 
service provision. The expertize of contractors, economies of scale or their specialist 
resources bring benefits on these dimensions and are argued to be reasons for their use (Bel 
and Fageda 2009). Theories of political blame instead suggest that this neglects the impact of 
political accountability structures and negativity bias, which makes blame and its avoidance a 
key concern of politicians using contracts. Legal theories are an alternative perspective with 
public authorities transferring some aspects of legal liability to a contractor, with potential for 
them or others to sue for failings. However, legal responsibility cannot always be passed on 
to avoid liability, for example, in the United States, ‘state action’ has frequently been 
adjudicated to extend into public tasks handled by privately owned contractors (Malatesta and 
Carboni 2014). The blame theory of contracting suggests, regardless of the legal position, that 
citizens may hold politicians less to blame when a service is contracted out because the 
contractors play an active role in service delivery. 
 
Focusing on public services, we identify the effects of an information cue about 
contracting service delivery. Our interest is in cases where citizens face a service that clearly 
falls short of a reasonable standard. The issue is how far local politicians, as the collective 
elected political executive for a locality, are seen as to blame when in receipt of a cue about 
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contracted services in comparison to when citizens are in receipt of alternative cues about 
different forms of service delivery as benchmarks for comparison. The first benchmark 
compares the information cue about contracting with the circumstances of a cue containing 
no information about the form of service delivery. The no information cue is relevant to 
actual service contexts because, whilst some citizens may know about local management 
structures, the literature on political knowledge stresses the unevenness of factual knowledge. 
A consistent finding is the widespread lack of knowledge about political institutions and how 
they operate (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997). If citizens do not know a contractor is involved 
they cannot consider this as a mitigating factor in reducing politicians’ responsibility for the 
service failure. The comparison with this benchmark suggests the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: An information cue that local politicians have chosen to have the service delegated 
through a contract with a private firm managing day-to-day service delivery reduces citizens’ 
blame of local politicians for service failure compared to a cue with no information about 
service delivery. 
 
The second benchmark entails comparing the information cue about contracting with 
a cue in which citizens are told that politicians are involved in managing the day-to-day 
delivery of street maintenance. The explicit mention of politicians’ role potentially links them 
with the service failure more closely in the minds of citizens. This cue does not suggest that 
politicians are taking up shovels and actually repairing the streets themselves. Instead, it 
states that politicians are involved in the management of service delivery, reflecting overlap 
between politics and administration. Andrews and Boyne (2010) note political leadership as 
part of the management of services in English local government and identify its effects on 
service performance. In the same domain, Copus’ (2014, 179) study of 30 local political 
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leaders and associated elected politicians found that many ‘link their role and responsibilities 
very firmly to service-based activities and not only to the provision or oversight of public 
services, but also to the quality, cost and efficiency of those services.’ The role is of general 
relevance. For example, in the US, many elected mayors are concerned with the practical 
management of services, such as preparedness for bad weather. They also engage actively 
with hands-on management tools such as performance measurement systems (Ho 2006). 
Where politicians’ role in management of delivery is extensive this role can be made apparent 
to citizens in a cue, suggesting the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: An information cue that local politicians have chosen to have the service delegated 
through a contract with a private firm managing day-to-day service delivery reduces citizens’ 
blame of local politicians for service failure compared to a cue that politicians have chosen to 
be involved in managing day-to-day service delivery. 
 
Our definition of contracting regards it as a specific form of delegation through 
politicians making use of a contract with a private firm. We also consider an alternative cue 
about a different form of delegation entailing delegation of management of service delivery 
to a unit within the local government. Local governments typically use their own public 
managers and associated staff to manage delivery of services in cases where delivery is not 
contracted out. The relationship between politicians and those they employ to manage is at 
the heart of public management research. However, there is very little systematic empirical 
evidence about whether highlighting public managers’ involvement in service delivery 
shields politicians from blame.  We assess whether this cue reduces blame compared to the 
two benchmarks of no information about delivery structures and politicians being involved in 
managing service delivery.  
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An experiment about blame for poor street maintenance  
 
We conducted an online experiment with 1,000 citizens to assess the effect of information 
cues on citizens’ views about local politicians’ blame for service failure. Hood (2011, 159) 
argues that it is difficult to assess institutions’ effects on blame because ‘the social science 
technology for testing such efficacy is still in its infancy’. However, experiments using 
randomization are a useful method for estimating effects on blame by allocating the four cues 
randomly to different groups of participants. Such a research design is also more practicable 
than, for example, trying to get local governments randomly allocated to use or not use 
contracts with private firms. We presented the participants in the experiment, which was 
approved by an institutional ethical review board, a hypothetical but realistic service failure 
of local street maintenance services, followed by random allocation of information cues about 
the forms of service delivery.  
 
Study participants were recruited from an online panel of citizens run by Global 
Market Insite (GMI). The internet is a reliable way of recruiting samples and can even reduce 
biases found in traditional samples (Gosling et al. 2004; Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling 
2011). Gosling et al. (2004, 93) found that large internet samples are typically diverse in 
terms of gender, socio-economic status, geographical region and age and found self-reporting 
internet questionnaires were consistent with responses from traditional (paper-and-pen) 
methods. High quality online panel studies yield more representative samples than in-person 
convenience samples, which commonly rely on student participants (Gosling et al. 2004; 
Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012, 351). Esterling, Neblo and Lazer (2011, 486) note that GMI 
panel samples are only slightly less representative in terms of diversity compared to the 
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general population. For our experiment, GMI recruited 1,277 panel members to open the 
survey. From this group, 1,000 participants passed an instructional manipulation check (as 
recommended by Oppenheimer, Meyvis and Davidenko (2009)) of correctly moving a slider 
to a specific point on the scale to test attention and guard against click-through responses 
without reading the materials and were randomly allocated to one of the four information cue 
groups.  
 
The sample size is sufficiently large to have sufficient statistical power to detect 
effects of providing information on citizens’ attitudes of a magnitude found in previous 
studies (James 2011a; 2011b; James and Moseley 2014; James and Van Ryzin 2015). The 
sample’s characteristics are similar to those of the broader population of England (which 
stands at 53.9m). However, it has a higher mean age and unemployment level and a higher 
mean proportion educated beyond school, as well as a lower non-White proportion. In terms 
of regional spread it also slightly under-represents London and over-represents the Midlands, 
but has good overall distribution across regions and on other variables, as summarized in 
Table 1. Overall, the sample allows good generalisability to the broader population of citizens 
and is much more representative than a student sample. As shown in Table 2, randomization 
resulted in similarity across the experimental groups on all these variables, and ANOVA tests 
revealed no statistically significant differences between the groups, suggesting that the 
procedure for random assignment was successfully implemented. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the experimental sample and mean values for the general 
population  
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum England 
(mean) 
Age in years  50.62 15.21 16 82 40 
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Household after 
tax income in 
pounds  
22,329 15,524.8       3928 75,526 24,780 
Female  0.50 0.5 0 1 0.51 
Unemployed  0.09 0.28 0 1 0.06 
Education beyond 
school 
0.57 0.50 0 1 0.41 
Full time student 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.04 
Ethnicity non- 
white  
0.07 0.25 0 1 0.15 
Rural  0.21  0.41                  0 1 0.19 
Region London 0.10    0.30           0 1 0.15 
Region south  0.37    0.48 0 1 0.37 
Region midlands 0.29   0.45 0 1 0.20 
Region north 0.25     0.43 0 1 0.28 
Source: Survey and Office for National Statistics 2011 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of participants in the four experimental groups 
Variable Politicians 
manage 
delivery 
 
Delegated unit 
within local 
government 
Contract with a 
private 
company 
No 
information 
about delivery 
structure 
Age (mean) 50.63 50.93 51.02 49.90 
Income (mean) 22075.38 22813.79 21789.08 22636.96 
Female 126 135 123 116 
Unemployed 24 21 20 23  
Education 
(beyond 
140 137 141 147 
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school) 
Full time 
student 
6 7 7 11  
Ethnicity (non- 
white) 
20 12 15 19 
Rural 50 63 49 51  
Region 
(London, 
South, 
Midlands, 
North) 
29 23 30 19  
90 92 91 93  
72 73 65 78 
59 62 64 60  
Per 
experimental 
group 
250 250 250 250 
 
 
Participants were asked to imagine they lived in an area called Normaltown with 
locally elected politicians using taxes to fund street maintenance services. Participants were 
presented with photographic evidence of service failure with three photographs clearly 
showing poorly maintained streets (see Appendix 1). Visual information influences 
perceptions in similar service contexts (Van Ryzin, Immerwahr and Altman 2008) and has 
previously been used to influence perceptions of service quality in an experiment (Van Ryzin 
2013). We use the same approach, with photographs of ‘category 1 defects’ of the kind 
‘representing an immediate or imminent hazard’ or a rapidly developing risk of ‘structural 
deterioration’ (Department for Transport 2012).  
 
Having viewed the photographs, respondents’ perceptions of street maintenance 
quality were measured to confirm that the service was perceived as poor. A multi-item 
17 
 
measure was used with four items. First, for the safety of all street users, second, for visual 
appearance, third, for quality of the ride if driving or riding in a car or other form of transport, 
and, fourth, for overall quality. The items 1 (safety) and 3 (quality of the ride) are aspects of 
quality used by Poister and Thomas (2011) in measuring citizens’ perceptions of state 
highways. The two further items relate to other important aspects of citizens’ views of street 
quality (Department for Transport 2012). Participants’ mean street quality assessment was 
8.57 (standard deviation 11.80), on a scale from 0 = extremely poor to 100 = extremely good, 
which indicates that the service quality was indeed perceived of as very poor, potentially 
triggering blame. [Note 1] 
 
Immediately following the presentation of the service failure, participants were 
presented with hypothetical information from the Normaltown local government website 
about the service. This sequencing draws on research about responses to negative outcomes 
that suggests that citizens are likely to seek out information about service delivery structures 
following service failure. Wong and Weiner (1981) show that people search for explanations 
of events and their causes following negative outcomes and Folkes (1984) found consumers 
to be motivated to discover reasons behind problems with products or services. However, 
ambiguity about the level of government responsible for services confuses citizens’ 
judgements in some systems (DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons 1990). In contrast, the English 
system is clearer in allocating local streets to non-overlapping territorial local government 
jurisdictions but, to avoid any potential ambiguity, we told all participants that Normaltown 
local government politicians funded the service.  
 
In the experiment, participants were randomly allocated to four experimental 
conditions (250 in each group) with different information cues about the managing of street 
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maintenance service delivery (see Table 3 and Appendix 1). The random allocation of cues 
enables the consequences for blame to be attributed to the variation of treatment with the 
groups probabilistically similar to each other in other respects (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 
2002, 1–12). The information presented reflects different information provided about forms 
of service delivery by local governments in England from a survey of the websites of a 
random sample of 20 of the 152 ‘upper tier’ local governments. One website provided no 
information about management of service delivery, two cases had information about 
contracting delivery to a private firm, one case presented politicians as having an active role 
in managing day to day delivery and sixteen cases had information about delegation within 
the local government.  
 
Table 3: Experimental groups to which participants were randomised 
 
Group Information cue  
Group 1 No information about delivery structures 
Group 2 Normaltown Local Government politicians managing day-to-day delivery 
Group 3 Delegation  through a contract with a delegated unit within Normaltown 
Local Government, with the unit’s managers managing day-to-day delivery  
Group 4 Delegation through a contract with a firm, Normaltown Private Company, 
with the company’s managers managing day-to-day delivery 
 
 
Following the information cue treatments, participants were asked about blame of 
local politicians using a five-item measure. We adapted McGraw’s (1991, 1140) measure of 
blame. She asked ‘To what extent do you believe [politician] is deserving of blame for his 
budget amendment vote?’ and, as part of a broader analysis of political blame, examined the 
influence of shared responsibility for unpopular legislative outcomes on citizens’ blame of 
individual legislative politicians. We substituted local government politicians who control a 
local government as a group potentially to blame for failure. As a development of previous 
measures, to increase validity in the context of public services, we used multiple items of 
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blame for specific aspects of the service known to be important to citizens (see Appendix 1 
for the full blame measurement items). The item of blame about ‘standards for the quality of 
the street surfaces’ reflects citizens’ expectations about what service quality should be 
(Poister and Thomas 2011; James 2011; Van Ryzin 2013). They compare their preferred 
standards to perceived local standards, potentially blaming local politicians if they think the 
standards are not appropriate. The item of blame for ‘budget for street maintenance’ measures 
citizens’ blame of politicians for the budget being inadequate or too generous. Glaser and 
Hildreth (1999) show that citizens differ in willingness to pay for local services, suggesting 
that politicians can be blamed or rewarded for having an appropriate level of spending. The 
item of blame for ‘street surface quality outcomes shown in the photos’ draws on research 
that shows how citizens perceptions of public service outcomes affect a range of attitudes 
about the services (see Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog 1992; Van Ryzin, Immerwahr and 
Altman 2008; James 2011b), with poor outcomes likely to attract blame. The item of blame 
for ‘how street maintenance services are organized’ draws on Van Ryzin (2011) who notes 
how process as well as service outcomes matter for citizens’ attitudes towards services. In the 
full sample, the blame measure has a mean of 77.59, a standard deviation of 20.78 and the 
scores range from 0 to 100 (0 = not at all to blame, 100 = completely to blame). [Note 2]  
 
Results 
 
We analysed the effects of different information cues about delivery of street maintenance 
services. Table 4 reports results using regression models with dummy variables for each form 
of information cue to test the two hypotheses about the contracting cue reducing blame. To 
check the robustness of findings and potentially to reduce the standard errors of the estimates 
we report models including covariates that affect citizens’ attitudes towards public services 
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similar to blame. These are gender, age, employment, education, ethnicity, income, rural/non 
rural residency (Lyons Lowery and DeHoog 1992; Glaser and Hildreth 1999; Brown 2007; 
Van Ryzin, Immerwahr and Altman 2008; James 2011b). We also include controls for 
different regions with London as the base category. We report the findings in two sets of 
models with different baselines to show more explicitly the results of the test the hypotheses 
(Models 1 and 2 to test Hypothesis 1 and Models 3 and 4 to test Hypothesis 2).[Note 3] 
 
Table 4: Citizens’ blame of local politicians for street maintenance service: linear regressions 
with information cue treatments and covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables   
 
   
     
Politicians manage 
delivery 
5.16*** 
(2.78) 
4.94*** 
(2.67) 
  
     
Delegated unit within 
local government 
1.00 
(0.54) 
0.77 
(0.41) 
-4.16** 
(-2.25) 
-4.18** 
(-2.26) 
     
Contract with a private 
company 
2.46 
(1.33) 
2.16 
(1.17) 
-2.70 
(-1.46) 
-2.78 
(-1.51) 
     
No information about 
delivery 
  -5.16*** 
(-2.78) 
-4.94***  
(-2.67) 
 
Female  -0.38 
(-0.29) 
 -0.38 
(-0.29) 
Age  0.15*** 
(3.11) 
 0.15*** 
(3.11) 
Unemployed  -3.18 
(-1.34) 
 -3.18 
(-1.34) 
Education beyond school  0.76 
(0.55) 
 0.76 
(0.55) 
Full time student  -2.90 
(-0.71)   
 -2.90 
(-0.71)   
Ethnicity non-white  1.88 
(0.70) 
 1.88 
(0.70) 
Income  -.00 
(-0.82) 
 -.00 
(-0.82) 
Rural  1.84 
(1.12) 
 1.84 
(1.12) 
South  -2.71  -2.71 
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(-1.14) (-1.14) 
Midlands  -1.70 
(-0.69) 
 -1.70 
(-0.69) 
North  -1.22 
(-0.49) 
 -1.22 
(-0.49) 
Constant 75.44*** 
(57.56) 
70.23***     
(17.84) 
80.60*** 
(61.49) 
75.17***    
(19.29) 
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
F-test 2.93** 2.16*** 2.93** 2.16*** 
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
     
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for two tailed tests of null that coefficient = 0 
 
 
The results are contrary to the main expectations of the simple theory of contracting 
and blame and reveal more complex responses by citizens. Model 1 in Table 4 shows that 
contracting does not reduce blame compared to no information about service delivery, 
contrary to Hypothesis 1. Model 1 also shows that the information cue that politicians are 
involved in managing day to day delivery raises blame by 5.16 percentage points, 95% CI: 
[1.52, 8.80], from the cue of no information baseline of 75.44. This increase in blame shows 
that politicians who explicitly associate themselves with management of public service 
delivery face increased blame if the service is a failure.  
 
Model 3 shows that contracting does not reduce blame compared to being told that 
politicians manage service delivery, contrary to Hypothesis 2. However, there is support for  
‘delegation’, with the management of service delivery by a delegated unit within local 
government reducing blame by 4.16 percentage points, 95% CI: [-7.80, -0.53], from the cue 
of politicians involved in managing service delivery baseline level of 80.60. This reduction in 
blame shows that the cue about delegation, but not delegation through contracting to a private 
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firm, can reduce blame compared to politicians who explicitly associate themselves with 
management of public service delivery.  
 
Discussion 
 
The information cue about delegation reduces blame in contrast to politicians being involved 
in managing service delivery but not compared to citizens given no information about service 
delivery. Both contrasts are important for public service delivery, the former when citizens 
seek out or are made aware of the service delivery structures and the latter when they are not 
aware. Research on general political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Ketter 1997) and 
knowledge about public service delivery (Van Slyke and Roch 2004) shows that citizens 
often lack information. In these circumstances, the question then becomes whether citizens 
actively seek out, or are otherwise provided with, information to reveal the delivery 
structures, which we discuss in the conclusion.  
 
The findings show that all the information cue conditions raise blame at least slightly 
when compared to the no information cue. These increases are possibly because raising the 
subject of delivery arrangements increases citizens’ thoughts about who is involved in the 
failure and to blame, triggering an increased blame response.  
 
The inclusion of covariates in Models 2 and 4 in Table 4 does not substantially alter 
the main findings of the analysis and confirms the results of the hypothesis tests are robust to 
the inclusion of these covariates. Age is positively related to blame, but we do not interpret 
this or any of the other covariates causally because it was not part of our experimental 
manipulation. [Note 4]  
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Conclusion 
 
The results challenge the expectation of the simple theory of contracting and blame that 
citizens who are informed that the management of service delivery is contracted out to a 
private firm reduce their blame of local politicians when there is a failure. However, 
contracting involves both delegation by politicians and use of the private contractor and the 
results show that a cue about delegation to a unit within the local government reduces blame 
of politicians compared to a cue about them being involved in managing service delivery. 
The findings suggest that politicians seeking to avoid blame can use delegation as an ‘agency 
strategy’ to reduce blame from citizens by stressing the role of public managers in carrying 
out service delivery rather than politicians’ own role in the domain of the management of 
delivery. 
 
The reduction in blame may partially protect politicians from citizens’ behavioural 
responses following on from failure. There are good reasons to think that even a modest 
reduction in blame improves outcomes for politicians. Previous research has found that it 
typically takes very high levels of dissatisfaction before individuals will exercise their 
political voice and complain or vote in protest against incumbents (Dowding and John 2012, 
92-3; James and Mosely 2014). Similarly, very high dissatisfaction is needed to trigger exit 
by leaving a local service provider because of the high costs of this action (Dowding and 
John 2012, 95-97). Reducing blame from very high levels is likely to make critical voice and 
exit responses to failure less likely. Analysis at the aggregate voting level has established that 
incumbent politicians in English local government, on average, suffer electoral damage from 
their association with poorly performing services in the areas they control (Boyne et al. 
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2009). Evidence about citizen blame for service failure at the individual level sheds light on 
an important part of the mechanism by which these aggregate results are generated and 
suggests a research agenda of examining whether differences in local delivery structures are 
associated with variation around this average result. In particular, when citizens see 
politicians as being directly involved in managing service delivery of a failing service they 
afford them the highest blame of the four delivery conditions, potentially triggering the most 
electoral damage. The findings imply, for example, that local mayors who make public 
statements to explicitly increase their association with managing preparedness for storms, or 
local politicians who pledge to use their skills in working with administrators to drive up the 
performance of local services, will suffer a stronger political backlash if citizens subsequently 
perceive these services negatively.   
 
The results indicate that the type of organization chosen by politicians to manage 
service delivery matters to citizens, confirming that citizens care about the process of service 
delivery not just service outcomes (Van Ryzin 2011; Van Slyke and Roch 2004). Street 
maintenance in England shows evidence of partial ‘blame reversion’ (Hood 2011, 162) with 
citizens appearing not to accept information about private firms’ involvement in delivery as a 
reason to reduce their blame of politicians. There have been well publicized arguments 
between English politicians and private contractors about their respective contributions to 
causing service failures (Committee of Public Accounts 2014). In this context, 40 percent of 
citizens are either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ concerned about private companies being involved in 
public services compared to only 27 percent expressing the same view about charities and 
voluntary organizations (Populus 2012, 6). These attitudes are related to citizens’ views about 
the competence and motivation of public and private organizations that vary across 
jurisdictions and the nature of the service. Where citizens’ acceptance of private sector 
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involvement is lower than other forms, as in this case, politicians appear to be blamed for 
choosing to use a private firms rather than being able to pass on blame to the contractor. 
Future research should look at contracting and blame in contexts with different levels of 
support for types of organizational involvement in public services and the effect of using 
alternatives including not for profit organizations. 
 
Failure of street maintenance is important to most citizens so they have an incentive to 
become informed about delivery structures as a potential reason for failure. However, Brown 
(2007) notes that citizens’ satisfaction with local services differs according to whether they 
are a taxpayer and/or a consumer of the service.. For example, taxpayer, non-users, may care 
primarily about the tax-financed cost and may have less interest in discovering information 
about reasons for failure of service quality. Citizens typically have low levels of general 
political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Ketter 1997) and knowledge of some public services 
(Van Slyke and Roch 2004). Research should examine if citizens blame response is different 
for services that they do not themselves directly use. Potentially, politicians could even 
present citizens with misleading or false cues that do not match actual service delivery 
structures.  However, this strategy is unlikely to be tenable for any period of time for many 
salient and widely used local services because local citizens have the means and incentives to 
become informed about them. Politicians attempting to reduce the risk of being blamed for 
service failure are only likely be successful in this aim if they pay careful attention to the type 
of organization they choose to manage delivery. 
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Notes 
1. The scale was assessed using principal components factor analysis. Perceptions of surface 
quality factor has an eigenvalue of 3.11 indicating single dimensionality (a potential second 
factor has an eigenvalue of just 0.39). The factor loadings of each item are all similarly high 
(ranging from 0.83 to 0.93) helping justify the straightforward approach of using a mean 
score to create the perceptions of service measure. The alpha of 0.90 suggests the measure 
has good internal consistency. 
2. The first factor eigenvalue of 3.80 suggests single dimensionality (a potential second factor 
has an eigenvalue of just 0.47). The factor loadings of each item are all similarly high 
(ranging from 0.78 to 0.91), helping justify using a mean score to create the blame measure. 
The alpha = 0.92 suggesting internal consistency. 
3. Whilst the directional hypotheses could justify one tailed tests, the more conservative 
approach of reporting two tailed tests is adopted in Table 4.  
4. The reduction in blame from the politicians managing delivery cue to the contracting cue 
and the reduction from the politicians managing delivery cue to the delegation inside the local 
government cue are not statistically significantly different from each other, and only the latter 
is statistically significant from the politicians managing delivery cue. Using robust standard 
errors in the regressions to check for robustness (results not reported) does not affect any of 
the findings from test results on the models. 
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